git: update for git 2.0

2014-06-28T13:14:56Z

prefixcmp() and suffixcmp() have been remove, functionality is now provided by starts_with() and ends_with(). Retrurn values have been changed, so instead of just renaming we have to fix logic. Everything else looks just fine.

Fix cgit_parse_url when a repo url is contained in another repo url

2014-04-05T22:05:36Z

For example, if I have two repos (remove-suffix is enabled): /foo /foo/bar http://cgit/foo/bar/ is interpreted as "repository 'foo', command 'bar'" instead of "repository 'foo/bar'"

parsing.c: Remove leading space from committer

2014-01-15T23:53:08Z

This did not really break anything in the past since spaces are ignored when rendering HTML. Remove the preceding space anyway to prevent from potential future problems. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer

parsing: fix header typo

2014-01-10T16:45:43Z

Replace most uses of strncmp() with prefixcmp()

2014-01-10T16:01:29Z

This is a preparation for replacing all prefix checks with either strip_prefix() or starts_with() when Git 1.8.6 is released. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer

Update copyright information

2014-01-08T14:10:49Z

* Name "cgit Development Team" as copyright holder to avoid listing every single developer. * Update copyright ranges. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer

Mark several functions/variables static

2013-03-05T00:50:39Z

Spotted by parsing the output of `gcc -Wmissing-prototypes [...]`. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer

White space around control verbs.

2013-03-04T14:12:54Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

do not write outside heap buffer

2012-10-02T02:03:47Z

* parsing.c (substr): Handle tail < head. This started when I noticed some cgit segfaults on savannah.gnu.org. Finding the offending URL/commit and then constructing a stand-alone reproducer were far more time-consuming than writing the actual patch. The problem arises with a commit like this, in which the user name part of the "Author" field is empty: $ git log -1 commit 6f3f41d73393278f3ede68a2cb1e7a2a23fa3421 Author: Date: Mon Apr 23 22:29:16 2012 +0200 Here's what happens: (this is due to buf=malloc(0); strncpy (buf, head, -1); where "head" may point to plenty of attacker-specified non-NUL bytes, so we can overwrite a zero-length heap buffer with arbitrary data) Invalid write of size 1 at 0x4A09361: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463) by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61) by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73) by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153) by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171) by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181) by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690) by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191) by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56) by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120) by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544) by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322) Address 0x4c718d0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd at 0x4A0884D: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) by 0x455C85: xmalloc (wrapper.c:35) by 0x40894C: substr (parsing.c:60) by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73) by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153) by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171) by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181) by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690) by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191) by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56) by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120) by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544) Invalid write of size 1 at 0x4A09400: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463) by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61) by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73) by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153) by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171) by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181) by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690) by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191) by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56) by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120) by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544) by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322) Address 0x4c7192b is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd Invalid write of size 1 at 0x4A0940E: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463) by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61) by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73) by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153) by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171) by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181) by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690) by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191) by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56) by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120) by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544) by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322) Address 0x4c7192d is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV) Access not within mapped region at address 0x502F000 at 0x4A09400: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463) by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61) by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73) by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153) by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171) by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181) by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690) by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191) by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56) by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120) by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544) by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322) This happens when tail - head == -1 here: (parsing.c) char *substr(const char *head, const char *tail) { char *buf; buf = xmalloc(tail - head + 1); strncpy(buf, head, tail - head); buf[tail - head] = '\0'; return buf; } char *parse_user(char *t, char **name, char **email, unsigned long *date) { char *p = t; int mode = 1; while (p && *p) { if (mode == 1 && *p == '<') { *name = substr(t, p - 1); t = p; mode++; } else if (mode == 1 && *p == '\n') { The fix is to handle the case of (tail < head) before calling xmalloc, thus avoiding passing an invalid value to xmalloc. And here's the reproducer: It was tricky to reproduce, because git prohibits use of an empty "name" in a commit ID. To construct the offending commit, I had to resort to using "git hash-object". git init -q foo && ( cd foo && echo a > j && git add . && git ci -q --author='au ' -m. . && h=$(git cat-file commit HEAD|sed 's/au //' \ |git hash-object -t commit -w --stdin) && git co -q -b test $h && git br -q -D master && git br -q -m test master) git clone -q --bare foo foo.git cat < in repo.url=foo.git repo.path=foo.git EOF CGIT_CONFIG=in QUERY_STRING=url=foo.git valgrind ./cgit The valgrind output is what you see above. AFAICS, this is not exploitable thanks (ironically) to the use of strncpy. Since that -1 translates to SIZE_MAX and this is strncpy, not only does it copy whatever is in "head" (up to first NUL), but it also writes SIZE_MAX - strlen(head) NUL bytes into the destination buffer, and that latter is guaranteed to evoke a segfault. Since cgit is single-threaded, AFAICS, there is no way that the buffer clobbering can be turned into an exploit.

Remove dead initialization in cgit_parse_commit()

2011-07-22T12:21:11Z

The value stored to "t" during its initialization gets overwritten in any case, so just leave it uninitialized. Spotted by clang-analyzer. Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer Signed-off-by: Lars Hjemli

cgit/parsing.c, branch v0.10.2